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11 Introduction
The cartel-fringe model, also called the dominant ﬁrm model, of the oil market describes
the pricing of oil in a situation where supply comes from a coherent cartel and a large
group of fringe members. The model was introduced by Salant (1976), who considered
the case of zero extraction costs and a continuum of price taking fringe members. He em-
ployed the open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) as the equilibrium concept. The model
was later analyzed by Ulph and Folie (1980), again with a continuum of fringe members
and the OLNE equilibrium concept, but for positive constant marginal extraction costs,
possibly diﬀering between the cartel and the fringe. The cartel takes as given the pro-
duction path of the fringe and chooses a price path whereas the fringe ﬁrms are price
takers and determine their production paths. The cartel and the fringe simultaneously
choose their respective strategy. Because each ﬁrm’s strategy is in the form of a path we
call this game the open-loop dominant ﬁrm nonrenewable resource game. An important
contribution of Salant (1976) is to provide microfoundations of this model by showing
that it is a limiting case of an asymmetric oligopoly model where fringe ﬁrms don’t act as
price takers. More precisely, consider the asymmetric oligopoly game with one dominant
ﬁrm (e.g., with a low cost of extraction and/or larger reserves) and a ﬁnite number of
fringe ﬁrms who compete à la Cournot in the natural resource market. Salant (1976)
shows that when the number of fringe ﬁrms becomes arbitrarily large the equilibrium
outcome of the open-loop game coincides with the equilibrium outcome of the open-loop
dominant-ﬁrm nonrenewable resource game.
Open-loop strategies are acceptable in environments where ﬁrms can commit over
the whole time horizon to a production path or a price path, for instance under the
assumption of a perfect futures’ market. However, this may not be an acceptable way
to model ﬁrms’ strategies in environments where ﬁrms have information about stocks at
future dates and have the ﬂexibility to change their course of actions during the game:
the equilibrium obtained with open-loop strategies may not be subgame perfect. In the
latter case, we consider the set of closed-loop strategies where a ﬁrm chooses states’ (i.e.,
stocks) dependent strategies.
In this paper we specify and solve a closed-loop dominant ﬁrm nonrenewable resource
game. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop dominant ﬁrm
nonrenewable resource games coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe ﬁrms becomes
2arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop oligopoly game does not
coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop dominant-ﬁrm nonrenewable
resource game. While the ﬁrst result shows the robustness of the open-loop cartel-fringe
outcome derived in Salant (1976), our second result contrasts with the case where ﬁrms
use open-loop strategies.
More speciﬁcally, we consider an oligopoly where each ﬁrm exploits a private ex-
haustible resource and where one ﬁrm (the cartel) has a cost advantage over the other
ﬁrms (fringe ﬁrms). All ﬁrms compete à la Cournot in the resource market. Assume the
cartel chooses a strategy that speciﬁe st h ee x t r a c t i o nr a t ea te a c hm o m e n ta saf u n c t i o n
of the state, described by the vector of stocks of all ﬁrms, at that moment. While the
cartel takes the strategy of each fringe ﬁrm as given, its extraction rate depends on the
i t so w ns t o c ka sw e l la sa l lf r i n g eﬁrms’ stocks. When weighing the impact of an extra
unit of extraction at a given moment it takes into account three eﬀects (i) the additional
revenue, (ii) the reduction of its available stock and (iii) the impact of this change in
its own stock on the extraction of its competitors. This latter eﬀect that we refer to
as the feedback eﬀe c ti sa b s e n tw h e nﬁrms use open-loop strategies. We show that the
equilibrium outcome of the open-loop game cannot be supported as the outcome of an
equilibrium of the closed-loop game. This is due to the presence of the feedback eﬀect.
More surprisingly, we show that this remains true even in the limit case where the num-
ber of fringe ﬁrms is let to tend to inﬁnity, while keeping the agregate resource stock
unchanged: the feedback eﬀect does not vanish as the market power of each fringe ﬁrm
is diluted by the increase in the total number of fringe ﬁrms.
In deriving our conclusions we exploit the analysis in Benchekroun et al. (2008) which
provides a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of an asymmetric
nonrenewable resource game with a ﬁnite as well as an inﬁnite number of fringe players,
for all possible constant marginal extraction costs. Benchekroun et al. (2008) is closely
related to Lewis and Schmalensee (1980) and Loury (1986) which have studied the case
of a ﬁnite number of oligopolists. The former authors were mainly interested in the order
of exploitation and their analysis mainly concerns the case of two players. Loury studies
the case of equal costs. All these papers focus on the case where ﬁrms use open-loop
strategies.
Polasky (1990) shows in a discrete time model with a ﬁnite number of players that the
open-loop equilibrium is not subgame perfect if the exhaustion dates of ﬁrms diﬀer. He
3then considers a duopoly model with linear demand and equal and constant marginal
extraction costs. He also postulates an exogenous instant of time T, after which the
extracted commodity is worthless. He then claims that if the per period proﬁt function
is quadratic in extraction and depends only on current extraction (and not on existing
stocks) and if no ﬁrm exhausts before T,open-loop and feedback equilibria coincide. But
then he proves that in the duopoly model with equal initial stocks and equal constant
marginal extraction costs and in the absence of an exogenous T, the open-loop and
the feedback equilibrium do not coincide because one ﬁrm can and will manipulate its
o w ne x h a u s t i o nt i m ei nap r o ﬁtable way. The present paper uses a continuous time
formulation of a nonrenewable resource oligopoly, allows for asymmetries between ﬁrms
(in terms of costs, stocks and number of ﬁrms in each category) and includes the cartel-
fringe framework.
Our methodology is related to the work done by Groot et al. (1992, 2003) who studied
the case of the cartel being a Stackelberg leader and the fringe being a price taker. The
cartel-fringe model with Stackelberg leadership was ﬁrst introduced by Gilbert (1978).
It is well-known that in this model the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium concept suﬀers
from time inconsistency for plausible parameter values, and is therefore not a feedback
equilibrium (see Newbery (1981) and Ulph (1982)). But open-loop and closed-loop
equilibrium outcomes do coincide for at least some parameter values. In this paper we
consider the case where the cartel and fringe ﬁrms simultaneously choose their respective
strategies.
To our knowledge this paper is a ﬁrst to specify a closed-loop formulation for a
dominant ﬁrm dynamic game. The diﬃculty lies in reconciling the intrinsic myopic
behavior of a fringe ﬁrm assumed through price taking and the rather sophisticated
(or farsighted) behavior assumed by the use of closed-loop strategies. We propose the
following scenario for the closed-loop dominant ﬁrm model: each fringe ﬁrm takes the
price path as given and determines its extraction strategy which is allowed depend on
its own stock only; the cartel takes each fringe ﬁrm’s strategy as given and determines a
pricing strategy (or alternatively a production strategy) that depends on its own stock
and all fringe’s stocks. The outcome of this simultaneous move is an equilibrium if the
market of the resource is in equilibrium at each moment.
We present the model as well as the open-loop Nash equilibrium with a ﬁnite number
of fringe ﬁrms in the next section. In section 3, we compare the equilibrium outcomes of
4the open-loop oligopoly game and the closed-loop oligopoly game. The crux of the paper
is in section 4 where we consider the closed-loop dominant-ﬁrm nonrenewable resource
game.
2 M o d e la n dt h eO p e n - l o o pN a s he q u i l i b r i u m
There are two types of mines c and f, distinguished by their marginal extraction costs.
There is one c−type mine, owned by a cartel, and there are n mines of the f−type. The
owner of an f−mine is called a fringe member. Marginal extraction costs are constant:
kc and kf. The cartel’s initial stock is Sc
0. Fringe ﬁrm i (i =1 ,2,...,n) is endowed with
an initial stock S
f
0i. Demand for the resource is stationary and linear with a choke price
¯ p : p(t)=¯ p − d(t), where p(t) is the price at time t, d(t) is the quantity demanded
at time t and ¯ p>max{kc,kf}. We work in continuous time, which starts at time
0. Extraction rates at time t ≥ 0 are denoted by qc (t) ≥ 0 and q
f













0i as aggregate supply and initial aggregate stocks of
the fringe ﬁrms. In an equilibrium at each moment t ≥ 0 t h ep r i c eo ft h er e s o u r c ei s
given by p(t)=¯ p−qc(t)−qf(t). For the time being all fringe ﬁrms are assumed identical




0/n. Any feasible extraction path for a ﬁrm is
subject to the condition that total extraction over time equals the initial stock. This is












i (s)ds = S
f
0i
and for fringe member i. We formulate the resource constraints as an equality because
in any equilibrium all resource stocks will get exhausted in view of the assumption that
¯ p>max{kc,kf}. In the oligopoly game, ﬁr m sc o m p e t eàl aC o u r n o ti nt h er e s o u r c e
market and the objective of each ﬁrm is to maximize the discounted sum of its proﬁts
with an equal and constant discount rate r.
Deﬁnition: Open-loop Nash Cournot equilibrium (OLNE)
5A vector q(.) ≡ (qc (.),q
f
1 (.),...,qf
n (.)) with q(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0 is an open-loop
Nash-Cournot equilibrium if
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j (s) − ˆ q
f




for all feasible ˆ q
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i .
Benchekroun et al. (2008) characterize the OLNE of this nonrenewable resource
oligopoly game. They allow for an arbitrary number of ﬁr m st h a th a v et h ec-type mines.
For our present purpose this is less relevant, as will be made clear in due course. By
S, C and F we denote intervals of time with simultaneous supply, sole supply by the






(¯ p + k
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For a given S
f
0, there exists ˜ Sc
0 > 0 such that the OLNE sequence reads C → S → F if
Sc
0 > ˜ Sc
0 and S → F if Sc
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OLNE S → F S S → C
3 Open-loop versus closed-loop: the case of a ﬁnite
number of players
A closed-loop strategy for a ﬁr mi sad e c i s i o nr u l et h a tg i v e st h ee x t r a c t i o nr a t ea tt as a






The deﬁnition of a closed-loop Nash equilibrium CLNE reads as follows1.
Deﬁnition: Closed-loop Nash-Cournot equilibrium (CLNE)









is a closed-loop Nash-Cournot
equilibrium if
i. the resource constraint is satisﬁed for all ﬁrms, where qc (t)=φ
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for all feasible strategies ˆ φ
c
.
iii. for all i =1 ,2,...,n
1F o rb o t ht h eO L N Ea n dC L N Ew eg i v ea na d - h o cd e ﬁnition for this resource game, for a more
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for all feasible strategies ˆ φ
f
i .
In this section we determine whether the OLNE outcome can coincide with the
outcome of a CLNE.
The case S → F
Proposition 1 provides conditions for the OLNE equilibrium to contain the sequence
S → F. We seek to determine if there exists a CLNE, that is therefore subgame-perfect,
that replicates the exploitation path of the OLNE, given a vector of initial stocks. The
cartel takes the closed-loop strategy of the fringe φ
f (S,t) as given and chooses a closed-
loop strategy φ


























i (S (s),s)ds ≤ S
f
i ,i=1 ,2,...,n (3)
for all non-negative couples (S,t), with qc(s)=φ
c (S (s),s).
































c is the costate variable associated with Sc and μc
fi is the costate variable as-
sociated with S
f
i . Applying the maximum principle gives the following set of necessary
conditions for an interior solution at time t:
e
−rt¡
¯ p − 2q
c(t) − φ





















































Appendix A provides a further characterization of the OLNE in this case, based on
Benchekroun et al. (2008). There it is shown that along the phase of simultaneous
supply, taken to be from time 0 till time t1, the production paths of the fringe and the
cartel along the OLNE are given by
(n +2 ) q































f are the constant shadow prices of the resource stocks of the cartel and
the fringe members respectively. Hence, in view of (4) and (7), for a CLNE to result in
the extraction path of the OLNE, we must have μc
c (s)=λ
c, for all instants s ≥ t for all













Given the symmetry of fringe ﬁr m sw em u s th a v ee i t h e re−rsqc + μc
fi =0where qc




i (S (t),t)/∂Sc =0 . The ﬁrst possibility is in contradiction with the necessary con-
ditions since it implies from (6) that ˙ μc
fi(t)=0 , but e−rsqc (t) is not constant along
the OLNE. Thus we have established that for the OLNE outcome to coincide with the




∂Sc =0for all t ≥ 0, for every fringe ﬁrm i.








































¯ p + nkf − (n +1 )kc¢
n +1
As explained in appendix A the ﬁrst of these two latter equations states that the
market price at the instant of exhaustion of the resource equals the choke price; the
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(9)
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¯ p + nkf − (n +1 )kc¢
n +1
(12)






















is strictly decreasing in X and therefore
∂(λc−2λf)
∂Sc 6=0since T>t 1. Hence for any
equilibrium that reads C → S → F or S → F a necessary condition for the CLNE to
yield the OLNE extraction path is not met. Note that our result holds true even in the















10The argument also goes trough for any cost constellation that yields this equilibrium
sequence. We have thus shown the following.
Proposition 2
Suppose the OLNE yields the sequence S → F then the OLNE extraction path cannot
be obtained as the extraction path of a CLNE. This is true even when n →∞ .
To conclude our analysis we note that for a vector of strategies to qualify as a non-
degenerate CLNE it must specify extraction rates for all possible values of the initial
stocks. Since there always exists a range of initial stocks such that the OLNE yields the
sequence S → F we conclude from proposition 2 that there exists no CLNE that will
replicate the OLNE equilibrium outcome for all values of the vector of stocks.
It turns out that this result is robust to restrictions on the state space. Suppose
we consider a less restrictive condition where we require a CLNE to replicate an OLNE
outcome only for a subset of positive measure of the state space.
The case S → C
For initial values of the stocks such that such that the OLNE sequence is S → C,
Proposition 2 does not rule out the possibility that there exists a CLNE to replicate an
OLNE outcome. We know from Proposition 1 that if kf < 1
2[¯ p+kf] the equilibrium reads
S → C if the initial resource stock of the fringe is not too large. We seek to determine
whether there exists a feedback Nash equilibrium, that is therefore subgame-perfect, that
replicates the exploitation path of the OLNE, given a vector of initial stocks. Along the
phase of simultaneous supply equations (7) and (8) hold, where, in the case at hand
λ
c = e








































It readily follows that qf (t) is independent of Sc. Contrary to the previous case we
will henceforth concentrate on the fringe. The problem is that we cannot repeat the
11steps taken in the previous case, since we have to be clear about what to mean by a
marginal change in the stock of one of the fringe members, keeping the other stocks ﬁxed.
This poses a diﬃculty because it has been assumed that all fringe members are equal,
and the OLNE has been derived under that assumption. However, it is not diﬃcult to
conceptualize what will happen if one fringe member is given an addition to its reserve.
All other fringe members will exhaust their resource before this fringe member under
consideration does, as is formally demonstrated in Appendix B. Hence it is left with the
cartel as sole competitor. We are therefore done if we can show that the OLNE and the
CLNE do not coincide for the case of a single cartel and a single fringe member. Due
to symmetry this is straightforward since we can repeat the steps taken in the previous
case, ceteris paribus, and obtain the same negative result. For the sake of completeness
the proof is given in detail in appendix C.
Proposition 2b
Suppose the OLNE yields the sequence S → C,i . e .
1
2









then the OLNE extraction path cannot be the outcome of a CLNE extraction path. This
is true even when n →∞ .
4 Open-loop versus closed-loop: the cartel-fringe game
The open-loop Nash cartel-fringe nonrenewable resource game is speciﬁed in Salant
(1976) and unfolds as follows. There is a coherent cartel and a number of fringe ﬁrms
each possessing a stock of the nonrenewable resource. Each fringe ﬁrm takes the price
path as given and chooses a path of extraction, whereas the cartel takes the extraction
path of the fringe as given and determines a price path. All ﬁrms choose their respective
strategies simultaneously. The outcome of this game is an equilibrium if the market
equilibrium holds at every moment. We denote the open-loop equilibrium of cartel-
fringe game by OL-CFE.
It can be shown that the limit case of the OLNE outcome when the number of fringe
ﬁrms tends to inﬁnity yields the outcome of an OL-CFE (Salant (1976) Appendix B
treats the case where extractions costs are zero).
Proposition 3
12The OL-CFE, with price taking behavior of the fringe members, is characterized as
follows:
i. If 1




2 (¯ p + kc)=kf, then the equilibrium sequence is S → F
iii. If 1
2 (¯ p + kc) >k f, let σCFE ≡ kf−kc




0 <σ CFE Sc
0/S
f




OL-CFE S → F S S → C
While the open-loop formulation of the cartel-fringe model is widely used and an-
alyzed in the literature, there exists, to our knowledge, no analysis of a closed-loop
formulation of the cartel-fringe game. This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to specify a closed-
loop formulation for a dominant ﬁrm dynamic game. The diﬃculty lies in reconciling the
intrinsic myopic behavior of a fringe ﬁrm assumed through price taking and the rather
sophisticated (or farsighted) behavior assumed by the use of closed-loop strategies.
We propose the following scenario for the closed-loop dominant ﬁrm model: each
fringe ﬁrm takes the price path as given and determines its extraction strategy which is
allowed to depend on its own stock only; the cartel takes the closed-loop representation of
the fringe’s production path as given and determines a pricing strategy (or alternatively
ap r o d u c t i o ns t r a t e g y )t h a td e p e n d so ni t so w ns t o c ka n da l lf r i n g eﬁrms’ stocks. The
outcome of this simultaneous move is an equilibrium if the market of the resource is
in equilibrium at each moment. We denote the closed-loop equilibrium of cartel-fringe
game by CL-CFE. Formally
Deﬁnition: Closed-loop Cartel-Fringe equilibrium (CL-CFE)

























(i =1 ,2,...,n) is a closed-loop
Cartel-Fringe equilibrium (CL-CFE) if
i. the resource constraint is satisﬁed for all ﬁrms, where qc (t)=φ
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for all feasible strategies ˆ φ
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for all feasible strategies ˆ φ
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i .













v. for all t ≥ 0:π(t)=Max
©










corresponds to the aggregate extraction of the fringe written
in a closed-loop form. It is not a strategy per se, it arises from the individual optimal
choice of each fringe ﬁrm of a production path, and gives the behavior o ft h ef r i n g ea sa




given and determines its pricing (or production) strategy which is allowed to depend on
its stock and the fringe’s stock. Condition v states that, for any t ≥ 0, given a vector





c (t,S (t)) yields the price π(t) taken as
given in the fringe’s problem stated in iii.
The assumption about the fringe ﬁrms’ behavior is important and is a modelling
choice. One could follow alternate assumptions regarding the fringe ﬁrm’s degree of
sophistication. For instance the fringe ﬁrm could be allowed to consider the price rule
as given but not the price path; in which case the fringe ﬁrm can still inﬂuence the
price path through its inﬂuence on its own stock. This latter behavior of the fringe ﬁrm
did not appeal to us because it assumes that a fringe ﬁrm, while determining its best
response to a strategy of the cartel, is aware of the impact of its own stock on the market
price but is not aware of the impact of its own quantity sold on the same market price.
This implication appears rather contradictory. Thus, and in keeping with the typically
assumed myopic behavior of a fringe ﬁrm, we retain the assumption that each fringe
14ﬁrm takes the price path as given and that it may condition its extraction rate on its
own stock only2.
We argue that with a price taking fringe, there exists a CL-CFE that yields the same
outcome as the OL-CFE outcome, for any composition of the initial stocks. The proof
consists of three steps. First we build a closed-loop representation of each fringe ﬁrm’s
production path under the open-loop cartel-fringe equilibrium (Lemma 1 below). Then
we show that for the cartel, the closed-loop representation of its open-loop equilibrium
price is a best response to the fringe ﬁrms closed-loop strategy (built in the ﬁrst step)
(Lemma 3 below). We complete the proof by noting that for each fringe ﬁrm, the closed-
loop representation of its open-loop equilibrium strategy (built in the ﬁrst step), is a
best response to the open-loop cartel-fringe (OL-CFE) price path.
We only present the details of the proof for the case where the sequence of the OL-
CFE is S → C ,i . e . ,w h e n1
2 (¯ p + kc) >k f and for Sc,Sf such that Sc
Sf >σ CFE.A
similar treatment and the same conclusion regarding the existence of a CL-CFE that
yields the same outcome as the OL-CFE outcome holds when the OL-CFE sequence is
S → F. From here on, we are assuming that 1
2 (¯ p + kc) >k f.
To write closed-loop representations of the open-loop equilibrium paths it will be






+ z − 1.
with domain3 (0,1]. It can easily be checked that the function h is strictly decreasing
over (0,1] with limz→0 h(z)=∞ and limz→∞ h(z)=0 . Therefore, for any A ≥ 0 there
exists a unique solution in (0,1] to h(z)=A.
For any Sf ≥ 0,l e tx b et h eu n i q u es o l u t i o ni n(0,1] to
h(x)=
rSf
¯ p + kc − 2kf (13)
and for any Sc,Sf ≥ 0,l e ty b et h eu n i q u es o l u t i o ni n(0,1] to
h(y)=r
2Sc + Sf
¯ p − kc . (14)
Lemma 1
2Given a price path, the only payoﬀ relevant information for a fringe ﬁrm is its own available stock.
3The reason why we focus on this domain is transparent in Lemma 1 and its proof, see e.g. (15).
15For any Sc,Sf ≥ 0 such that the OL-CFE sequence is S → C,t h eO L - C F Eo u t c o m e
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c − 2k
f¢
(x − 1) −
1
2
(¯ p − k
c)(y − 1) (16)
where x and y are respectively the unique solutions in (0,1] to (13) and (14).
Proof: see Appendix D.
Note that when Sf =0we have x =1and when Sf = Sc =0we have y =1 .
Therefore, the closed-loop strategies given in (15) and (16) also represent the open-loop
extraction paths during the last phase C, where the cartel is the sole supplier, with
φ









(¯ p − k
c)(1− y).
We also remark that the strategies are feedback strategies (they do not depend on time
explicitly); this is due to the fact that the problem of each ﬁrm is autonomous.
The closed-loop representation of the production paths allows to get the cartel’s
discounted sum of proﬁts in a closed-loop form.
Lemma 2
For any Sc,Sf ≥ 0 such that the OL-CFE sequence is S → C, a closed-loop repre-




































2 + x − 2y
¢
}
where x and y are respectively the unique solutions in (0,1] to (13) and (14).
Proof: see Appendix E.
We are now able to state the following.
Lemma 3
16For any Sc,Sf ≥ 0 such that the OL-CFE sequence is S → C, the cartel’s closed-loop
strategy (16) (representation of the cartel’s open-loop equilibrium production path) is
a best response to the fringe’s closed-loop behaviour (15) (representation of the fringe’s
open-loop equilibrium production path).
Proof: see Appendix F.
Given the price path of the OL-CFE, and using the symmetry among the fringe ﬁrms















¯ p + k
c − 2k
f¢
(1 − xi) (18)





¯ p + kc − 2kf ,( 1 9 )
is a closed-loop representation of the best response of the fringe ﬁrm to the OL-CFE
price path.
The resource market clearing condition is obviously satisﬁed since it is satisﬁed under
the OL-CFE and the closed-loop strategies replicate the output path and therefore price
path of that equilibrium4.
Proposition 3
For any Sc,Sf ≥ 0 such that the OL-CFE sequence is S → C,t h e r ee x i s t saC L - C F E
that yields the same outcome as the OL-CFE’s outcome.
Remark: The same treatment and result holds for the case where the OL-CFE’s
sequence is S → F. Given the similarity (in the approach and length) of the proof with
the case presented in Proposition 3, it is omitted.
Proposition 3 combined with Proposition 2b allows us to draw an important conclu-
sion regarding the microfoundation of the cartel-fringe model.
Corollary
The closed-loop cartel-fringe equilibrium outcome does not coincide with the outcome
of the limit case of the asymmetric oligopoly CLNE where the number of fringe ﬁrms
tends to inﬁnity.
This is in sharp contrast with Salant (1976) where price taking behaviour of the














yields the OL-CFE price path.
17fringe ﬁrms is arbitrarily large. The diﬀerence is due to the presence of the additional
level of interaction in the game with closed-loop strategies. In the case of a closed-
loop oligopoly, when deriving its best response to the competitors’ strategies, each ﬁrm
(large and small) can still impact the extraction rates of its competitors (even though it
takes their strategies as given). This additional layer of interaction in a CLNE makes the
OLNE and the CLNE diﬀer and does not vanish as the market power of fringe ﬁrms goes
to zero. When ﬁrms can use closed-loop strategies, the outcome of the game where the
fringe is assumed from the outset to be price taker is not useful to predict the outcome
of the limit case where the market power of the fringe ﬁrms becomes arbitrarily small.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have considered the exploitation of a nonrenewable resource under imperfect com-
petition and where ﬁrms are asymmetric. In the case of an asymmetric oligopoly model
we have shown that the outcome of the OLNE cannot be obtained as the outcome of a
CLNE even in the limit case where the number of high cost ﬁrms tends to inﬁnity. In the
case of the benchmark cartel-fringe model, we speciﬁed and solved a closed-loop domi-
nant ﬁrm nonrenewable resource game, with a price taking fringe. We have shown that
the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop dominant ﬁrm nonrenewable resource
game (à la Salant 1976) coincide. Moreover, we have shown that the interpretation of
the dominant ﬁrm model, where the fringe is assumed from the outset to be price taker,
as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly where the number of fringe ﬁrms tends to
iniﬁnity does not extend to the case where ﬁrms can use closed-loop strategies. Indeed,
when the number of fringe ﬁrms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of
the closed-loop oligopoly game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the
closed-loop dominant ﬁrm nonrenewable resource game.
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Appendix A
Here we summarize the ﬁndings on the open-loop Nash equilibrium with a ﬁnite
number of players. There is one cartel and there are n fringe members. Each fringe ﬁrm
i takes the strategy proﬁle of its n competitors as given and maximizes its present value






















where qf and qc denote the aggregate supply by the fringe and the supply by the cartel,















Among the necessary conditions we have that the co-state variables are constant since
stocks are absent from the Hamiltonians. In addition, the Hamiltonians are maximized
with respect to the own supply of the agent. We will use the symmetry among the fringe
players, i.e. q
f
i = qf/n and λ
f
i = λ
f for all i. Then we arrive at the following necessary
conditions.




























The ﬁrst condition follows from the maximization of the Hamiltonian of player i.T h e
second condition is necessary in order for the cartel not to supply.
Along a C interval:
e
















Along an S interval
(2 + n)q




































20Continuity of the price path at the diﬀerent possible transitions gives:
- a transition at t from S to C or vice versa requires
1
2







- a transition at t from S to F or vice versa requires
1
n +1










- a transition at t from F to C or vice versa requires
1
2













We also have to take into account that at the moment of exhaustion of all resource
stocks, the price must have reached the choke level:
p(T)=¯ p
Consider the sequence S → C, with C the ﬁnal phase before exhaustion and where the
transition takes place at instant of time t1 and exhaustion at T. Then it is tedious but






































¯ p + nk































In this appendix we modify the problem discussed in appendix A so as to allow for
an additional fringe member with a larger stock than all other n fringe members. We
will show that the stocks of all other fringe members will be depleted before the stock
of this particular fringe member is. The variables referring to the larger fringe member
are denoted by upper bars. Among the necessary conditions for an OLNE we have
e
−rt¡


























with equality holding if ¯ qf(t),qf(t) (aggregate supply of all other fringe members) and
qc(t) are positive, respectively. Since the fringe members only diﬀer with respect to the
stocks, the shadow price of the larger stock is smaller that the shadow price of each
smaller stock: ¯ λ
f <λ
f. This fact implies that we cannot have simultaneous supply at
the end because that would imply










which violates the requirement ¯ λ
f <λ
f. It cannot be the case that the larger stock is
exhausted before the smaller stock, because that would require that
e
−r ¯ T ¡
¯ p − q
c(¯ T) − q










f(¯ T) − k
f) ≤ λ
f
at the time ¯ T of exhaustion of the larger stock, which is infeasible.
Appendix C
Here we prove that the case S → C cannot be sustained as a closed-loop equilibrium.
As was made clear in the main text as wel as in Appendix B, we only have to consider
the case of a single fringe member. The cartel takes the closed-loop strategy of the
22fringe as given φ
f (S,t) and chooses a closed-loop strategy φ
c (S,t) that maximizes its





¯ p − q
c(s) − φ














f (S (s),s)ds ≤ S
f
for all non-negative couples (S,t), with qc(s)=φ










¯ p − q
c − φ











c is the costate variable associated with Sc and μc
f is the costate variable asso-
ciated with Sf. Applying the Maximum Principle gives the following set of necessary
conditions for an interior solution (i.e. qf > 0 and qc > 0):
e
−rt¡
¯ p − 2q
c(t) − φ

































We consider the case where the OLNE consists of a ﬁnal phase with S → C. The















Among the necessary conditions we have that the co-state variable λ
j is constant. In ad-
dition the Hamiltonian is maximized. This implies that if at time t t h e r ei ss i m u l t a n e o u s
supply we have
3q





























Along the C interval we have
2q








In addition, the equilibrium price is continuous at the time of transition t1. Moreover,
at the ﬁnal time T the price must be equal to ¯ p. Taking this into account we can derive
the stocks needed to have this equilibrium from some t in the S−phase on. We end up





































¯ p + k
c − 2k
f¢¡







¯ p + k
c − 2k
f¢¡





(¯ p − k
c)
¡
rT − rt− 1+e
rt−rT¢
From here on the analysis proceeds along the same lines as in the other case treated
in the main text. For completeness we write down the full argument. For a CLNE to
result in the extraction path of the OLNE, we must have μc
c (s)=λ
c for all instants
s ≥ t for all t ≥ 0. Therefore μc










24This implies that either (i) e−rtqc(t)+μc
f(t)=0where qc is the OLNE equilibrium path
of the cartel and therefore μc




Condition (i) implies that ˙ μc
f =0 , but e−rtqc (t) i sn o tc o n s t a n ta l o n gt h eO L N E .







along the OLNE where there is simultaneous supply. We next show that this condition
is not met in the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Our strategy is to assume that the open-loop equilibrium is subgame perfect. Con-
sequently we represent extraction by the cartel as a function of time and the existing










































¯ p + kc − 2kf¢
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Therefore, after substitution into the inverse demand, we have that the price is




















The transition time t1 is given by
e
rt1 =




26and the terminal time T is given by
e
rT =
¯ p − kc
λ
c (25)
The costate variables λ
c and λ
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¯ p + kc − 2kf = e
r(t−t1) and y ≡
λ
cert
¯ p − kc = e
r(t−T) (28)
W en o ws h o wt h a tx and y can be determined as the unique solutions to respectively
(13) and (14).
Substituting t1 from (24) into (26) yields after algebraic manipulations
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which can be simpliﬁed into
ln
µ

























¯ p + kc − 2kf +1 (31)
Combining (26) and (27) gives after simpliﬁcation
(¯ p − k














+ y = r
2Sc (t)+Sf (t)
¯ p − kc +1 (32)
Thus x and y depend on Sf and
¡
Sf,Sc¢
respectively and combined with (21) and (20)
along with (28) gives a closed loop representation of the open-loop paths (16) and (15).
For any t ∈ [t1,T] we have Sf =0and x =1 . It can easily be checked that
substituting x =1into (15) and (16) yields the extraction path of the cartel when it is
a sole supplier qf =0and (23)
Appendix E


























































































¯ p + kc − 2kf¢





rt =(¯ p − k
c)y
We then determine t1 and T as functions of x and y using (24), (25). Substituting λ
f,
λ
c, t1 and T as functions of x and y into (33) gives after algebraic manipulations (17)
Appendix F
To prove this claim we show that (17) satisﬁes the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB)
equation of the cartel’s problem.
Since x = x
¡
Sf¢
,f r o m( 3 1 ) ,a n dy = y
¡
Sf,Sc¢








28We check now that V satisﬁes the HJB equation for all
¡
Sf,Sc¢
(such that the equilib-
























with qf given by (15). This is done in two steps: (i) we ﬁrst check that qc given by (16)
solves the maximization problem; (ii) we show that when φ
f is given by (15) and qc is
given by (16) the function V c ¡
t,Sf,Sc¢
= Πc (t,x,y) satisﬁes the cartel’s HJB equation.
(i) The ﬁrst order condition associated with the maximization problem gives
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2(¯ p − k
c)
2 (y − 1)
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−rt(¯ p − k
c)y = λ
c (36)
Substitution of ∂V c
∂Scert and of φ






¯ p − k
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c − 2k
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−rt(¯ p − k
c)y = λ
c (38)
We now turn to ∂V c
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2(¯ p − k
c)y
We can now obtain ∂V c































(¯ p − k
c)ye
−rt
The last step consists of checking that when substituting each term ∂V c
∂t , ∂V c
∂Sf , ∂V c
∂Scqf and
qc into the HJB the equality holds for all Sf,Sc ≥ 0.T h i ss t e pi ss k i p p e d .I ti n v o l v e s
lengthy but straightforward algebraic simpliﬁcations only. More speciﬁcally it can be
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ce
−rt (39)
reduces to
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µ
ln
1
x
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f¢
−
1
4
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p + k
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f¢2
x
2 +
1
2
(p − k
c)
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p + k
c − 2k
f¢
x +
1
4
(p − k
c)
2 y
2 −
1
2
(p − k
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2 y +
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k
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f¢2
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